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Bringing Barth’s Critique of Religion to
the Inter-faith Table*
Tom Greggs / University of Chester
Although he criticized Barth under the enigmatic phrase “positivism of
revelation,”1 Bonhoeffer saw Barth’s criticism of religion as “his really
great merit.”2 In the present age in which inter-faith dialogue has be-
come more pressing than it has perhaps ever before been, theology can
at times engage in two conversations that are not only separate but at
worst self-contradictory: in its discussions with secular society, theology
can engage in critical discussions about religion, drinking deeply from
the well of criticism offered by the likes of Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Durk-
heim, and Marx;3 yet, in its discussions in inter-faith settings, the danger
can arise that these critiques are thrown out altogether or at least lie
in abeyance. If we are truly to realize the potential Bonhoeffer glimpsed
in Barth’s critique of religion, it is my contention that we must not
leave this important piece of theology aside as we enter dialogue with
members of other faith communities.4 Moreover, to engage in two sep-
* An earlier version of this article was presented at the Senior Systematics Seminars of
Cambridge University and King’s College, London. Thanks must be expressed to the partic-
ipants in these seminars for their critiques and helpful questioning. Thanks must also be
given to David Ford, Garrett Green, Paul Nimmo, and (especially) the two anonymous re-
viewers for their comments and suggested revisions. Without them, the article would have
been much the poorer.
1 See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. Eberhard Bethge (London:
SCM Press, 1999), letters of April 30, 1944 (280), May 5, 1944 (286), and June 8, 1944 (329).
2 Ibid., May 5, 1944 (286). On the relationship between Barth and Bonhoeffer over the
question of religion, see Andreas Pangritz, Karl Barth in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans.
Barbara Rumscheidt and Martin Rumscheidt (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 71–114;
Ralf K. Wu¨stenberg, A Theology of Life: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Religionless Christianity, trans. Doug
Stott (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmanns, 1998). Wu¨stenberg argues correctly that Barth and
Bonhoeffer are seeking to achieve different things: Barth offers a critique of religion but
never religionless Christianity.
3 As these names indicate, this is clearly a very specifically modern European conceptual
development, which cannot claim to be monolithically relevant for every religion in each
part of the world.
4 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. and trans. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, 14 vols. (Ed-
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arate conversations in almost completely different languages betrays
the danger of becoming a two-faced monster and of failing to recognize
our own particularity not simply as Christians but as Christians in the
twenty-first century. Such an approach of separate conversations—while
it may be the more simple to follow—fails to recognize that traditions
(at least in the Western world) are simultaneously engaged in an inter-
face with secular culture and an interface with other faiths as well.5 It
holds the danger of creating a conversation with faith partners in which
the real—albeit complex—dynamics of each faith are reduced to a uni-
directional discussion that lacks the complexity of each individual faith’s
relations in and with the world.
To look to Karl Barth, and especially to his paragraph on religion,
for help with this may at first seem neither a sensible nor apparent
possible solution.6 Barth lived in an age in which his concerns as a
inburgh: T&T Clark, 1956–75), 1, pt. 2, §17: “The Revelation of God as the Abolition [Aufhe-
bung] of Religion.” Henceforth Church Dogmatics will be cited as volume, part, and page (e.g.,
1, pt. 2:3, etc.) and referred to as CD. References to further criticism Barth cites against
religion can be found in Garrett Green, “Challenging the Religious Studies Canon: Karl
Barth’s Theory of Religion,” Journal of Religion 75 (1995): 473–86. The present article does
not address directly Barth’s discussion of the secular parables of the kingdom and the lights
of creation, except to enhance conceptual clarity or in order not to misrepresent Barth. The
reader is, however, directed to CD, 4, pt. 3, §69.2; George Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth:
The Shape of His Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 234–80; Geoff Thompson,
“Religious Diversity, Christian Doctrine, and Karl Barth,” International Journal of Systematic
Theology 8, no. 1 (2006), esp. 10–18; and Glenn Chestnutt, “The Secular Parables of the
Kingdom” (paper presented at the Society for the Study of Theology, Leeds, 2006).
5 There exists a vast wealth of material on the concepts of religion and the secular. At a
broad level, “secular” (from the Latin saeculum) refers to an increased focus on this age or
the world as opposed to a focus on the divine. This has had various effects and has developed
in various forms, which one is ill-advised to see as a single movement or unified whole. On
varieties of secularism and secularization, see David Martin, The Religious and the Secular: Studies
in Secularization (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), chaps. 1 and 4, and Reflections on
Sociology and Theology (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), chap. 14. See also Timothy Jenkins and Ben
Quash, “The Cambridge Inter-faith Programme: Academic Profile,” August 22, 2006, Cam-
bridge University, http://www.divinity.cam.ac.uk/cip/uploads/academic_profile.pdf, 2–3, for
their differentiation between secularism as “a set of minimal rules or dispositions that allow
the working together of the various religious intensities in some sort of political unit for some
sort of collective good” and as “a rival form, seeking to displace all these various forms of
intensity (designated collectively as ‘religion’).” This latter view of secularism as a doctrine is
also discussed in Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), chap. 1. Asad also remarks, however, that one should
note that “because the secular is so much a part of our public life, it is not easy to grasp it
directly” (16). For the purpose of this article, in addressing Barth’s own critique of religion,
reference to the illusive concept of the “secular” will be understood in very general terms as
taking a critical stance toward religion. Through examining Barth’s understanding of religion
(itself influenced by other modern Western European secular critiques of religion), this article
seeks to demonstrate what it is to internalize that critique within the Christian faith and how
that may itself help to underscore the practice of inter-faith dialogue by warning the Christian
of the dangers of idolatry.
6 Indeed, Thompson advocates that CD, §17, may be more problematic than helpful as a
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Christian were far more focused on the secular culture around him,
and, for all of his criticism of “religion,” he is prepared to conclude
his paragraph by speaking of the church as the locus of “True Reli-
gion.”7 With the exception of the particular question of the relation-
ship of Christianity to Jewish people, Barth did not betray an interest
in inter-faith issues.8 His approach to Islam was highly polemical, see-
ing it, for example, as a paganized form of Judaism.9 Sadly, this betrays
the fact that Barth was very much a man of his times—struggling with
the questions of his own age. While his generation’s questions clearly
concerned Christianity’s relationship with the Jewish people, his pri-
mary concern was not people of other religions but those who had
engaged in “the critical turn against religion.”10 However, Barth’s clear
concern with the issues of his own day charges the present-day theo-
logian with the task not simply to repeat Barth’s own theology but to
seek direction from the one whose tremendous theological acumen
should critically be brought to bear on the pressing issues of today’s
generation. What from his thought can we extract to assist us in our
present theological needs?
It has often struck me that one can find an unusual parallel between
Barth and the landscape gardener Capability Brown. Like Brown,
Barth’s theology forms a landscape that will take a century to realize
its “capabilities.” The task for students of Barth is neither to clear the
land altogether, which will only bring us back to the starting point, nor
to allow the garden to grow wildly without any pruning or care, which
will leave no thing of beauty at all. Rather, it is to tend to this land-
scape, to nurture it, prune it, and allow it to grow, bringing in new
features that are in keeping with it and ever improving the groundwork
that was carried out with such foresight. It is the task of today’s theo-
logian to prepare the garden in different theological seasons, with the
concerns and issues that the march of time brings about.
In order to keep to the above hermeneutical approach to Barth, this
article will not offer a detailed exegesis of §17. This has been done
resource for contemporary discussions and that one should ground a theology of the religions
elsewhere in Barth. Thompson, “Religious Diversity, Christian Doctrine, and Karl Barth,” 3,
6–10.
7 CD, 1, pt. 2:325ff.
8 See Eberhard Busch, “Indissoluble Unity: Barth’s Position on the Jews during the Hitler
Era,” in For the Sake of the World: Karl Barth and the Future of Ecclesial Theology, ed. George
Hunsinger (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2004), 53–79; Mark Lindsay, “Dialectics of Communion:
Dialectical Method and Barth’s Defense of Israel,” in Karl Barth: A Future for Post Modern
Theology? ed. Geoff Thompson and Christiaan Mostert (Adelaide: Openbook, 2000), 122–43.
9 CD, 3, pt. 3:28. For a more detailed and sensitive discussion of Barth’s relationship with
Islam, see Carys Moseley, “Karl Barth’s Theology of Religion: Interpreting Religious Change
Yesterday and Today” (paper presented at the Society for the Study of Theology, Leeds, 2006).
10 CD, 1, pt. 2:323.
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extremely well elsewhere and does not require addressing here.11 In-
stead, it will seek to apply Barth’s theology to an area where it may
bear unexpected fruit—the inter-faith table—and to ask the question
of what this theology looks like in an inter-faith setting.12 While Barth
does not address inter-faith issues, his paragraph on religion can high-
light issues that arise in approaching and sitting at an inter-faith table,
a table that must necessarily (given the concerns of the faiths) be one
on which secular-religious concerns also lie. Barth’s own approach to
religion as a general category is influenced heavily by the modern Eu-
ropean secular critique of religion, as found especially in Feuerbach.13
However, as will be seen, Barth’s version of this critique is grounded
in a Christian-specific form of that critique, which means that not only
is religion itself sublated by revelation but so too is the very notion of
religion.14 He gives a Christianized view of the critique of religion that
offers an interpretation of the category of “religion” that is still in
reference to thought that may be considered “secularist.” Furthermore,
it will be argued that in this endeavor Barth’s paragraph provides tools
with which to approach inter-faith dialogue while still retaining one’s
own particularity. The article will offer a vision of future inter-faith
dialogue centered around the concerns of Barth’s critique of religion
and will seek to discover what such dialogue might aim to achieve.
11 Green, “Challenging the Religious Studies Canon,” 476–83, and Barth on Religion: The
Revelation of God as the Sublimation of Religion (London: T&T Clark, 2007); and J. A. Di Noia,
“Religion and the Religions,” in Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 243–57.
12 To that end, this article has been circulated and discussed by Muslims, Jews, and Christians
in Cambridge and London interested in inter-faith matters to seek to discover how such ideas
are perceived by those actively engaged in this work and to attempt to gain a consideration
of these thoughts from the perspective of the other gathered around the table. For their time
and wisdom, I owe a debt of gratitude.
13 Although only a few references to Feuerbach exist in CD, 1, pt. 2, §17, one sees his
influence on Barth in Barth’s introductory essay to Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Chris-
tianity, trans. George Eliot (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), x–xxxii. Barth states, for example,
that “the attitude of the anti-theologian Feuerbach was more theological than that of many
theologians” (x) and that “so long as the talk about ‘God in man’ is not cut out at the roots,
we have no cause to criticize Feuerbach, but are with him ‘the true children of his century’”
(xxx). Therefore, while little direct discussion of the notion of the “secular” will take place
in the body of this article, it is believed that Barth’s own understanding of religion in §17 is
underscored by such secular critiques of religion from the nineteenth century. For a consid-
eration of Barth’s engagement with Feuerbach, see John Glasse, “Barth on Feuerbach,” Har-
vard Theological Review 57, no. 2 (1964): 69–96.
14 This point is made (albeit critically) by Thompson when he states: “The very argument
about religion which Barth resisted had already internalized the ‘religions’ within Christian
discourse on the basis of a putatively universal category of religion of which the religions
were specific instances.” However, Thompson goes on to state: “This is not to deny a priori
the legitimacy of a Christian, theological interpretation of what have come to be designated
‘the religions’”; see Thompson, “Religious Diversity, Christian Doctrine, and Karl Barth,” 8.
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This article offers a programmatic theory for inter-faith dialogue
centered around this paragraph of Barth, rather than primarily a re-
flection on practice with all the human complexity that this involves.
However, it is hoped that this theory may provide avenues for practice,
particularly for those who construct their own theology in dialogue
with the great Basel professor.15
i. some honesty about some difficult issues
Barth’s placing revelation in a position of primacy over religion, when
taken out of context, can confront one with the dangerous creature of
exclusivism.16 A deeper reading makes it quite clear that this cannot
be maintained, and, instantaneously, one would have to agree with
D’Costa that “Barth overturns these categories by being both an exclu-
sivist, inclusivist and universalist!”17 However, the exclusivist tones of
Barth’s work cannot be ignored. The church is singled out as the “locus
of true religion.”18 While revelation denies that any religion is true in
and of itself, the Christian religion becomes true from without in close
analogy to the way in which the sinner is justified.19 Within this analogy,
15 CD, §17, marks only one point of entry into inter-faith dialogue for one utilizing the
theology of Barth. If the critique of religion is seen to be too negative, perhaps more positive
assessments can be found in the likes of Barth’s doctrines of providence, witness, and the
Holy Spirit.
16 It is useful here to differentiate between types of exclusivism that may be confused by
readers of Barth: (a) there is a christological exclusivism; (b) related to this, there is reve-
lational exclusivism; (c) there is eschatological exclusivism, which denies salvation to the non-
Christian. While there can be no doubt that a is a proper and appropriate form of exclusivism
for Barth’s theology, I have argued elsewhere that this does not lead to c but quite the opposite:
see Tom Greggs, “‘Jesus Is Victor’: Passing the Impasse of Barth on Universalism,” Scottish
Journal of Theology 60, no. 2 (2007): 196–212. With regard to b, the situation is more complex.
Certainly, it cannot be separated from the one event of a, which means that pluralism must
necessarily be rejected as there can be no sources of revelation outside of Jesus Christ. There
is, thus, an exclusivity that exists in scripture and (at least in the early volumes of CD) church
proclamation as it attests to the one revelation of God in Jesus Christ (see CD, 1, pt. 1, §4,
on the threefold nature of the word of God). However, this exists in the dialectical tension
that comes with also realizing that the one Word of Jesus Christ relativizes all human words.
This can be seen in Barth’s later work on truth extra muros ecclesiae (CD, 4, pt. 3, §69). See
Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 245ff. Hunsinger summarizes Barth’s position nicely in
the aphorism “exclusivism without triumphalism or inclusivism without compromise” (280). It may
well be, therefore, that the form of christological exclusivism that Barth presents is the least
dangerous form of exclusivism one can have while still retaining a proper level of internal
coherence with basic expressions of belief for Christianity (as seen, e.g., in Nicaea and
Chalcedon).
17 Gavin D’Costa, “Theology of Religions,” in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to
Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century, ed. David F. Ford, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997),
630.
18 CD, 1, pt. 2:280, 298–99.
19 Ibid., 325–26.
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Barth writes that “we have no hesitation in saying that the Christian
religion is the true religion.”20 In the Hegelian dialectical terminology
Barth employs, religion is (to use Green’s language) “sublated” or (as
he now prefers) “sublimated” by revelation.21 In singling Christian rev-
elation out in this way, it is clear that Barth, in one sense at least, sees
the Christian religion as unique from his insider perspective as a Chris-
tian. That this perspective belongs to Barth’s insider view as a Christian
is underlined by his grounding this claim in terms of the Holy Spirit
and the church. He writes that the true religion “is an event in the
out-pouring of the Holy Spirit. To be even more precise, it is an event
in the existence of the Church and the children of God. The existence
of the Church of God and the children of God means that true religion
exists even in the world of human religion.”22 This may seem a bold
and arrogant claim. Moreover, Barth condemns theology that has lost
its proper object and turned to religion rather than revelation “in all
its uniqueness.”23 He is, furthermore, concerned with mission, speaking
of Christianity’s authority as a “missionary religion” with the authority
“to confront the world of religions as the one true religion, with ab-
solute self-confidence to invite and to challenge it to abandon its ways
and to start on the Christian way.”24 For Barth, the ultimate distinction
between Christianity and the other religions lies emphatically in the
name of Jesus Christ in whom the Christian religion is created,25
elected,26 justified,27 and sanctified.28 The ultimate and unshakable dis-
tinction between religions and the “true religion” can be seen “only in
Him, in the name of Jesus Christ, i.e., in the revelation and reconcil-
iation achieved in Jesus Christ. Nowhere else, but genuinely so in
Him.”29 For Barth, this revelation and reconciliation are inseparable:
reconciliation is the content of revelation, and revelation is the only
direct and overt means by which reconciliation may be known (albeit
there may be incognito forms).30 Both revelation and reconciliation
20 Ibid., 326.
21 See Green, “Challenging the Religious Studies Canon,” 477ff. Green traced the devel-
opment of his terminology in a recent paper. See Garrett Green, “Barth on Religion” (given
at the annual conference of the Society for the Study of Theology, Leeds, 2006). It is the
word “sublimated” that he now prefers for Aufhebung and uses in his new translation.
22 CD, 1, pt. 2:344.
23 Ibid., 294.
24 Ibid., 357.
25 Ibid., 346ff.
26 Ibid., 348ff.
27 Ibid., 352ff.
28 Ibid., 357ff.
29 Ibid., 346.
30 Discussed in CD, 4, pt. 3, §69.2.
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are identical with the person (“the name”) of Jesus Christ. They are,
thus, an event (a history) before they are a body of ideas. In this event,
the Jesus Christ of history who lived and died for us in the first century
CE in Palestine is present and effectual in the here and now.
Such an exposition of the paragraph leaves one wondering whether
Barth’s revelational model can provide any hope for inter-faith discus-
sion at all. At worst, he may seem intolerant; at best, he stands so far
within his tradition that it is difficult for him to see the other, let alone
engage in dialogue with her. This type of interpretation, as it is hoped
the following sections of this article will show, is in some ways at least
to build a straw man in the place of Barth in order to knock him down.
But it is worth acknowledging that clear difficulties exist in Barth’s pre-
sentation of the critique of religion, and it is not difficult to see how
some readers may take away the impression that Barth is a somewhat
bigoted Christian who seeks apologetically to establish the uniqueness
of Christianity over and against any other faith position. Crude as such
a presentation is, it does, however, highlight certain issues that the Chris-
tian theologian engaging in inter-faith dialogue must confront.
For all of Barth’s suggested exclusivism (at least on a christological
and possibly revelational level, if not on a soteriological one), one is
forced to ask the question in confrontation and dialogue with other
religions: is he right? Does Christianity rest upon exclusivity, an ele-
ment of which is no doubt found in all faiths? There is a very real
danger that, in speaking to other faith communities about Christianity,
what is brought to the table for discussion is not actually Christianity
as known and practiced at all. Indeed, the same may well be true of
the Muslim, the Jew, the Hindu, and others: desirous not to cause hurt
or offense, many of us often leave the exclusivist elements of our faith
at the door before entering into dialogue with those of other faiths.
Barth is surely right to assert: “The Christian religion is the predicate
to the subject of the name of Jesus Christ. Without Him it is not merely
something different. It is nothing at all, a fact which cannot be hidden
for long.”31 Only Christianity knows this name in its significance, in
spite of the critique of all religion Barth offers, for what it is. To sit at
the inter-faith table without this fact, painful as it may be in face of
the other, is to engage in a dishonest dialogue dishonestly. Our very
need to sit together is grounded not only in what we share but—and
herein lies the rub—in the differences we have. A number of very real
dangers can arise from various quarters if this is ignored. There is,
first, the danger that we sit down not as the other but as the same and
31 CD, 1, pt. 2:347.
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thus do not sit down as religious people wishing to engage in dialogue
at all. By this is meant that if we gather together around shared values
(perhaps associated with one of many shades of social liberalism), we
do not gather together primarily identifying as people of particular
faiths but only secondarily so: we can run the danger of actually gath-
ering together as people who are united by a (for all of the vagueness
of this term) liberal agenda, through which we then see our own faith.
Thus, for example, the Christian engaging in dialogue with the Muslim
(who is thereby simultaneously engaging in dialogue with the Chris-
tian) finds it easier to see herself in the Muslim who will engage in
such dialogue than the fundamentalist of her own faith who will not.
The dynamics of identity are complex. Without facing up to the diffi-
cult and painful forms of exclusivity all faiths possess (whether in terms
of the revelation of Jesus Christ or the Quran or the Abrahamic cov-
enant), we run the danger of people meeting primarily not from the
shared position of being members of different faiths or religions but
from a shared secular world view of some neutral space in which to
mediate conflict and in which faith is only expressed secondarily.
This leads to a second danger. This is that we do not engage in
dialogue but in mutual agreement and “head nodding.” Without con-
fronting the painful reality of the exclusive ultimates that we have
(however inclusive these may be),32 we run the risk of entering into
the kind of universalizing in which modernity has engaged in its un-
derstanding of religion—seeing ourselves as all the same and not,
therefore, presenting the at times problematic elements of the coex-
istence of our faiths in the religiously and socially heterogeneous com-
munities of which we are a part. Underscoring this is the descriptive
inadequacy of sameness, which can logically leave one wondering why
one is a Christian rather than a Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jew, or Sikh.
32 Since, as has been stated, both revelation and reconciliation are identical with the person
of Jesus Christ and are, therefore, an event before they are a proposition, Barth makes clear
in a later stage of his dogmatics that the Jesus Christ who died for us in history is present
and effectual here and now even extra muros ecclesiae: “As the reconciliation of the world to
God, the justification and sanctification of man, is the reality, and indeed the living and
present reality in Jesus Christ the true Witness of its truth, . . . not only intra but extra muros
ecclesiae there are also lights in the darkness, clarities in confusion, constants in the oscillating
dialectic of our existence, orders in disorder, certainties in the great sea of doubt, genuine
speaking and hearing even in the labyrinth of human speech. They are all very wonderful
and unexpected and unforeseen” (CD, 4, pt. 3:476). There is, therefore, a radical inclusivity
to be found in Barth’s radical and ultimate christological exclusivity. On the relationship
between Barth’s exclusivist christology and recognizing truth in non-Christian sources, see
George Hunsinger, “Epilogue: Secular Parables of the Truth,” in How to Read Karl Barth,
234–80. See also, expressing this in terms of ethics and natural theology, Stanley Hauerwas,
With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness and Natural Theology (London: SCM Press,
2002), 197–204.
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Part of the difficulty and pain in coming to the inter-faith table is that
we arrive as representatives (or better, members) of one religion and
thereby not as representatives (or members) of another. But if we do
not come as ourselves in all our rainbow-like differences, we can never
engage in dialogue and certainly not inter-faith dialogue. Uncomfort-
able as Barth’s theology of religion often is, it reminds us of how un-
comfortable those seats at the inter-faith table not only are but—if we
are to be internally coherent and to be present as members of our own
faiths—have to be. This is not to engage in something unloving; quite
the opposite, it is to bear that discomfort out of love for the other.
Surely such sacrificial love is an even greater virtue than that of tol-
erance:33 while tolerance pertains principally to ideas, love pertains to
persons, and in sitting with those who believe different things than we
do, we do not simply play with ideas but engage in love for the other.
ii. arriving at the table primarily critiquing oneself and not
the other
If elements of Barth’s revelational exclusivism cause modern liberal
sensibilities to feel uneasy at times, far more comforting for such sen-
sibilities is Barth’s recognition of the inclusive elements of the category
of “religion.” Barth’s critique of religion is not aimed at other faiths.
Indeed, his general lack of engagement in inter-faith dialogue should
surely remind us of this. The Christian religion is one form of the
subject “religion” of which there are other forms.34 Christianity, also,
therefore, stands under the critique of religion as Unglaube (faithless-
ness). What is more, the Christian religion stands under this judgment
above all religions. Far from revelation raising the status of the Chris-
tian religion above all other religions to a position of superiority, it
reveals to the Christian her religion as unbelief.35 Indeed, Barth spends
the first nineteen pages of his section on “True Religion” setting pro-
visos for the way in which the Christian must never construe her reli-
gion as true. The Christian religion cannot engage in heightening its
position through the judgment of revelation over and against religion;
instead, “it is our business as Christians to apply this judgement first
and most acutely to ourselves: and to others, the non-Christians, only
in so far as we recognise ourselves in them.”36 Similarly, he writes: “the
Christian religion . . . too, stands under the judgment that religion is
33 Note, however, Barth’s own theological defense of tolerance. See CD, 1, pt. 2:299.
34 Ibid., 281.
35 Ibid., 326.
36 Ibid., 327.
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unbelief, and that it is not acquitted by any inward worthiness.”37 For
all that the category of religion is negative for Barth, Christianity is
included in this category as the religion standing most firmly under
the judgment of God. From the great polemicist, there is the clear
assertion that both the criticism of religion and speech about Chris-
tianity as the “true religion” can never be engaged in “as preliminary
polemic against the non-Christian.”38 Even in achieving its goal, the
religion of the Church of Christ is viewed negatively. Barth is able to
speak of “knowledge and worship of God and a corresponding human
activity” but goes on to describe this in the following terms: “We can
only say of them that they are corrupt. They are an attempt born of
lying and wrong and committed to futile means. And yet we have also to
say of them that (in their corruption) they do reach their goals.”39
Such an approach to the Christian religion has a number of bene-
ficial practices to bring to the inter-faith table. The first is the clear
need for humility in approaching other faiths. Any sense of human
superiority whatsoever is excluded by Barth in his description of how
Christianity is the “true religion”: Christianity only becomes true
through a complete act of grace on God’s behalf.40 It is true only as
the religion standing most firmly under the judgment that revelation
offers to religion—faithlessness. This is not to say that Christianity is
to lack confidence in God’s gracious act toward it but that it is dialec-
tically to recognize the way in which it is “true religion” (grounded in
the fact that God has elected to reveal himself in the religious form of
Christianity) only as it stands within the thesis of “Religion as Unbe-
lief.” Standing most sharply judged under this thesis, the Christian can-
not come to the inter-faith table with any sense of a privileged position,
nor even as an equal, but only as one who is the most guilty of idolatry
and self-righteousness, even in the quest to purge herself of these
things. The Christian’s solidarity with the other is never as primus inter
pares but only as a member of the religion to whom God’s “No” is
most sharply spoken in the search and quest for God. It is this sharpest
“No” spoken to the Christian Church with which Barth is concerned—
never an intolerant attitude toward other faiths or an unloving one
37 Ibid.
38 CD, 1, pt. 2:326.
39 Ibid., 344; emphasis added.
40 “The confession of Jesus Christ as the one Word of God, says Barth, has nothing to do
with an arbitrary self-glorification of Christianity, the church, or the Christian. It is strictly ‘a
christological statement.’ . . . As such it does not entail any exaltation of the Christian over
the non-Christian, but rather an important bond between them. For the statement confronts
Christian and non-Christian alike with ‘the one truth superior’ to them both” (Hunsinger,
How to Read Karl Barth, 244).
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toward members of those faiths. Barth teaches the Christian engaging
in inter-faith dialogue that judgment does indeed begin in Christian-
ity’s own house.
Second, Barth emphasizes that we cannot separate Christianity from
other religions on the basis of a concept of “religion.”41 This means
that the Christian religion stands in solidarity with other religions. It
is clearly part of a category to which other forms of religion belong.
The connection between religions is evident in Barth, and it is only a
short step from here to speak of the need to engage with the other
forms of this phenomenon. However, for all that Barth sees solidarity
between faiths, he is correct to realize that there is still difference and
uniqueness: the flaw of naive pluralism is clear to Barth, and he stands
firm in the belief that Christianity needs Jesus Christ. In solidarity with
other religions, one must be truly concerned with other religions.
This need primarily to critique oneself brings with it the third im-
plication of never confusing God or revelation with the human form
of religion. Revelation stands over and against religion; it contradicts
it rather than stemming from it or returning to it.42 Religion is not
revelation. Nor is religion God. Religion seeks to be both of these
things and fails because it is idolatrous. This distinction is helpful when
one dares to assume at the inter-faith table the position of one’s own
God, whoever that unique God may be conceived to be for whichever
faith. A solidarity that mediates our differences around this point helps
one truly to engage in dialogue—not denying our different particular-
ities but also able within our particularity not to have to close our ears
to the words of the other. Gathering at the table as people of our own
“religion” is not the same as sitting in judgment as if we were God.
Turning the critique of religion back primarily on ourselves as Barth
does helps to accentuate this point and prevents us from engaging in
the blasphemy of playing God.43
iii. a critique of universals and the need for particulars
Early in the paragraph on religion, Barth very helpfully observes a re-
lationship between universals and particulars: “The revelation of God
41 CD, 1, pt. 2:298. In this way, as in secular critiques of religion, Barth does not see the
uniqueness of any one religion (even his own) qua religion.
42 Ibid., 303.
43 A recent broadsheet leader column, speaking about the Pope’s comments on Islam and
the reaction to them in September 2006, put it thus: “A modest acknowledgement that God
is not to be second-guessed . . . allows Muslims, Jews and Christians to rub along together
without taking constant offence at each other’s blasphemies” (Telegraph, London, September
17, 2006).
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is actually the presence of God and therefore the hiddenness of God
in the world of human religion. By God’s revealing of Himself the
divine particular is hidden in a human universal, the divine content in
a human form, and therefore that which is divinely unique in some-
thing which is humanly only singular.”44 Leaving aside the question of
the hidden-revealed dialectic found throughout Barth’s works, within
the universal of human “religion,” Barth recognizes the divine partic-
ularity. That this particularity of the divine revelation is found within
something that is humanly universal (i.e., religion) means that Chris-
tianity must be spoken of as something that is humanly only singular
(or remarkable) and not unique. This suggests a complex dynamic
between faiths. Not only is religion perceived to be a human universal
(as had been the case in nascent studies and secular critiques of reli-
gion, such as Feuerbach’s), but within that recognized universal, Barth
suggests, Christianity must perceive its unique revelation of the partic-
ular hidden God within its specific human form. Given this relation of
the particular to the universal, that which is “divinely unique” is pres-
ent in something which is “humanly only singular.” A sensitivity to this
relationship between the universal and the particular is the way in
which Barth can speak both of the relationship of Christianity to all
other religions and of it as the “true religion.”
Implicit in this speech about religions as singular, in comparison to
the divine particularity found in “revelation” and the human universal
found in “religion,” comes a way of mediating dialogue with the other
truly as the other while still recognizing the need to speak to each
other in the first place at all grounded in the universal of “religion.”
In the movement away from universals and overarching theories of
religion, this may seem rather outmoded, and certainly, for Barth, this
44 CD, 1, pt. 2:282. This passage is a difficult one to translate. Green’s new translation puts
it thus: “God’s revelation is in fact God’s presence and thus God’s hiddenness in the world
of human religion. Because God reveals himself, the divine particular is hidden in a human
universal, the divine content in a human form, and thus the divinely unique in something
merely humanly remarkable” (Green, Barth on Religion: The Revelation of God as the Sublimation
of Religion, 35). Clearly, “universals” and “particulars” have special connotations philosophically,
especially to what might be broadly spoken of as postmodern thought, and one must be
careful not directly to associate such usage with Barth for all of the connections one might
draw between his thought and postmodernism. For more on Barth and postmodernism, see
Thompson and Mostert, Karl Barth. The following reflections on this quotation seek—in
keeping with the hermeneutical approach to Barth outlined in the introduction—to broaden
out Barth’s specific discussion here, applying his thought on the critique of Christianity’s
religion and its relation to the uniqueness of revelation to the broader question of Chris-
tianity’s claim to uniqueness and its relation to other faiths. To do this, the inner logics of
Barth’s thought have been sought and expressed in a manner that perhaps at times is more
philosophical than Barth himself may have intended.
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human universal does not suggest that God’s direct revelation is pre-
sent in other religions.45 However, this dynamic really does explain
something of the desire to sit at an inter-faith table at all. It recognizes
a relationship between religions in terms of the human existence of
“religion” and yet the singularity of each religion from its own per-
spective of divine particularity: one does not have to surrender one’s
uniqueness in order to recognize one’s relationship to other forms of
religion. It is clear that in gathering around a table with Muslims, Hin-
dus, Sikhs, Jews, and so on, the Christian is doing something different
than in gathering around a table with Marxists, economists, milkmen,
and jugglers. Yet, in gathering with people of other religions, the Chris-
tian must also recognize that she is gathering with not only people of
religion but people of other religions.
The desire to say that the other is really like me lacks any form of
adequacy in description either of myself or of that other. And while
without a certain level of dissimilarity dialogue would neither be nec-
essary nor interesting, if the other is too dissimilar to me, the grounds
for shared dialogue are extraordinarily difficult. Inter-faith dialogue
falls between these two positions of seeing the other as the same as me
or as so alien to me that I do not have any shared language or identity
with which to dialogue with her at all. Inter-faith dialogue recognizes
the other truly as other to itself but also truly as other to itself. While
there may be little pressing need for Christianity as Christianity to sit
at a table with a group of jugglers as jugglers, the otherness of other
religions is an otherness in which the Christian can perceive her oth-
erness to those other religions. Barth’s lengthiest discussion of another
religion (with the exception of Judaism) comes in terms of his en-
gagement with two forms of Pure Land Buddhism.46 While he recog-
nizes in them certain traits of Protestantism as a religion of grace,
Barth still recognizes the otherness of these forms of religion to Chris-
tianity and Christianity’s otherness to them. Sitting at the table with
someone one perceives as identical to oneself requires no tolerance,
never mind the higher virtue of love: indeed, respect for the otherness
of the other is essential to a hermeneutics of agape. To listen to an-
other and only hear oneself is not to listen at all. Yes, there is a need
45 Here, one again sees a connection between Barth and the secular critique of religion.
The grouping together of all religions (regardless of their various particularities) under the
title “religion” is very much related to the modern view of religion that underlies secular
critiques of “religion” as a universal phenomenon. This has been sharply criticized. See, e.g.,
Martin, Religious and the Secular, 14–15.
46 CD, 1, pt. 2:340–44.
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for a recognition of the universal of religion (or else we fail to see the
particularity of religion as compared to those of no religion), but
around the inter-faith table we gather in our singularities.
iv. the need to listen and the need to speak
Part of Barth’s sharpest critique of religion lies in its self-centeredness.
Even in its attempt to overcome idolatry and self-righteousness in the
forms of atheism and mysticism, it remains idolatrous and self-righ-
teous, and Barth asserts: “Even in these two supposedly higher and
apparently inimical forms, whether in good or evil, in failure or suc-
cess, religion is still thoroughly self-centred.”47 The turn inward toward
the self, in which the human claims faith in herself, is at the heart of
Barth’s criticism of what is wrong with religion.48 It is perhaps a way of
speaking of religions under the Lutheran epithet cor incurvatum in se.
To be thoroughly self-centered seems to be the worst possible of sins,
on a par even with idolatry and self-righteousness. Even for the Chris-
tian who believes hers is the “true religion,” this danger is never far
away. What is condemned by Barth is “our Christian conceptions of
God and the things of God, our Christian theology, our Christian wor-
ship, our forms of Christian fellowship and order, our Christian morals,
poetry and art, our attempts to give individual and social form to the
Christian life, our strategy and tactics in the interest of our Christian
cause, in short our Christianity, to the extent that it is our Christian-
ity.”49 Inasmuch as Christianity is turned toward itself and the Christian
toward herself, Christianity stands under God’s judgment.
Such a criticism surely marks the need to recognize the other. For
Barth, this other is clearly Jesus Christ. But this also provides the pos-
sibility for speaking to the other in dialogue. Barth characterized
Christ both as the man for God and as the man for other humans.50
For the Christian to be centered on Christ, rather than herself, means
that she should be centered both on God and on other human beings.
While religion might simply point one back to oneself, Christ orien-
tates the Christian outward to God and to the world. The radical in-
clusivity of this is clearly evident within Barth’s work: “If we see Him,
we see with and around Him in ever-widening circles His disciples, His
people, His enemies and the countless millions who have not yet heard
His name. We see Him as theirs, determined by them and for them,
47 Ibid., 314–15.
48 Ibid., 314.
49 Ibid., 327.
50 CD, 3, pt. 2, §§44.1, 45.1.
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belonging to each and every one of them.”51 Part of this radical out-
wardness and orientation to others must surely include those of other
faiths to whose humanity Christ belongs. The Christian Church must
never be a merely inward-looking entity. If it is such, it ceases to be
the Christian Church by Barth’s description. The radical criticism of
religion does not point the Christian away from the religions of others;
it points toward them.
In this movement away from self-centeredness in religion, there is a
need to listen to the other. Barth criticizes religion for seeking to
“grasp at God.”52 Within the context of discussing revelation, Barth
criticizes the need of man to speak in religion instead of listening.53
For Barth, this is clearly the need to listen to revelation rather than to
presume to speak for God. The inter-faith table is not what he is pic-
turing in speaking about this. But, again, what does it look like when
one brings this perspective on Christian faith to that table? Awareness
of the dangers of speaking too quickly and presuming to speak for
God is surely a useful trait to have in sitting with people from other
religions. Moreover, with that clear danger of speaking must simulta-
neously come the need to listen. The opposite danger to failing to
recognize the otherness of the other at the table is the danger of seeing
the other as one to whom we must only speak, put right, and help to
understand our religion. Such a failure leads us directly back to the
problem of self-centeredness: in the dialogue we feel we need the first
and the last word, or else we seek to set the agenda on our own terms.
In short, we can fail to listen properly. Barth’s critique of religion leads
the person of faith to recognize the need to listen. For the person of
faith at the inter-faith table, there are two positive aspects to this. First,
she must listen to God’s unique revelation to Christianity properly and
carefully as it critiques her religion, rather than seeking to speak from
her religion, recognizing that revelation is not her own but God’s and
only belongs to her as much as to any human “religion.” Second, as a
result of this, she must be aware of the danger of speaking too quickly
and of the need to listen to the other. For the Christian, these two
cannot be separated. Jesus talked not only to but with people; he con-
versed. While (understandably) the gospel narratives focus on his
speaking, they also remind us of his listening.54
51 CD, 3, pt. 2:216.
52 CD, 1, pt. 2:302.
53 Ibid.
54 One may see this, for example, in the likes of John 4:1–42, in which Jesus engages in
genuine dialogue with the Samaritan woman (notably, a woman of a different faith than
orthodox Second Temple Judaism). Rather than simply lecture or preach at the woman, Jesus
asks and answers questions and discusses a major religious divide of his age—worship at
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Is this to say that the Christian engaging in inter-faith dialogue
should never speak? Clearly not, or else it would be no dialogue at all
or a dialogue from which we are removed. To cease to engage, to be
so fearful of speaking, and to abandon the desire to form a conception
of God leads only to the worst of all dangers—to the path toward athe-
ism or mysticism, which is itself a return to self-centeredness.55 Instead,
Christianity must engage in a dialogue held in the dialectical tension
of speaking simultaneously of religion as unbelief and of a true reli-
gion. How, then, are we to speak and listen? It is to this that it is now
necessary to turn.
v. what do we seek to gain from inter-faith dialogue?
gathering around the critique of religion
Dialogue is not simply an academic exercise. To employ German terms,
there is not only a sense in which dialogue involves wissen; there is a
sense in which it also involves kennen. It is not a religious studies lecture
or textbook in which we seek to learn empirical facts about the other—
to know about festivals, rites of passage, community formation, holy
books, and so on. Important as these may be, they are only a precursor
to dialogue. To gather around the inter-faith table involves facing the
other. In that way, it is not only educational but also formative. It is
not simply bidirectional (I speak and you listen) but complexly mul-
tidirectional (I speak, you listen, we learn, you speak, I listen, I rethink,
I speak again, etc.). It brings with it all the complexity of human re-
lations and interaction, and the fact that we are shaped by those
around us. Barth’s critique of religion reminds us that, while we still
retain the position of an insider to one singular faith, no religion is
an island. In that way, it has something quite distinct to offer to the
inter-faith setting. This distinct thing is its critical approach to the na-
ture of religion in any form. In bringing this to the table, we must note
how we are shaped by inter-religious dialogue, and we are engaged in
the process of shaping: not simply writing books to the other, which
are there in black and white with the final full stop in place, but en-
gaging in ever-ongoing conversation.
Barth’s critique of religion has an important shaping role for inter-
faith dialogue. Speaking as a Christian about the Christian struggle
with religion can help the Christian and possibly the other to identify
also those elements of their own religion with which they struggle. For
Mount Gerezim. Other significant examples of Jesus listening or engaging in dialogue can
be found in Mark 7:24–30 and Matt. 8:5–13.
55 CD, 1, pt. 2:317–25.
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the Christian to identify how her own religion is unhelpfully at times
“conditioned by nature and climate, by blood and soil, by the eco-
nomic, cultural, political, in short, historical circumstances in which
[s]he lives” enables her in inter-faith dialogue to recognize the histor-
ical penultimates of her own religion, which have been made the ul-
timates of practitioners.56 It is to recognize that all religions are con-
tinually engaged in a choice between evolving in their historical form
or preserving their present (or past) natures. It is to help and support
the other in that and to recognize that God should not be confused
with such penultimates.57 To come humbly to the table recognizing
these problems is to arrive at the table truly as we are—struggling not
only with our place among the religions but our place in an ever-chang-
ing and developing world. It is to recognize the problems that come
along with these changes—problems all too well known and variously
and violently expressed in a host of fundamentalisms. Sometimes it is
only in seeing the other that we truly see ourselves. If the Christian is
truly to engage in dialogue, this critique (of her religion) is what she
must bring to and (all the more importantly) take from the inter-faith
table in the hope that it will enable us all to begin to realize the cul-
tural determinants of our different religions, which so often (confused
with revelation) we wrongly see as the different eternal decrees we each
believe are uniquely given to our particular religions. Perhaps it is in
this way that the Christian engaging in inter-faith dialogue is to un-
derstand the aforementioned passages in Barth about mission, which
may seem to her most challenging in her inter-faith setting: the mission
with which to attend the inter-faith table is a mission to recognize re-
ligion for what it is and to help to mediate against confusing it with
God or revelation in all of their uniqueness—from each of our per-
spectives—to each of us.58 This is in itself a particularist (or singular)
agenda that revolves around a Christian-specific interpretation of the
56 Ibid., 316.
57 It is here, again, where the secular critique of religion in its Barthian theological form
proves helpful: in accepting their criticism of religion, the religious person is enabled to
distinguish between the penultimate nature of her human religion (which is normally the
critique offered to her) and the ultimacy of God (albeit, whom secular critics often confuse
with religion).
58 This is not an expression of some form of pluralism. It makes no suggestion that the
“God”s whom different faiths speak of are the same one God expressed differently nor that
their revelations are different expressions of the one reality. Instead, it recognizes the unique
(and at times exclusive) truth claims of each faith, but also the way in which these are corrupted
through each faith’s attempts at human expressions of this in their religion in a manner that
allows room for both unity and uniqueness. It recognizes that each faith has its own struggle
with religion and can learn from other faiths that have the same problems with the danger
of confusing ultimate truth claims with religion. An example of this is given in the next
paragraph.
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critique of religion as espoused from certain secular criticisms of reli-
gion. While the Christian cannot assume that other religionists will
accept this critique (although sometimes they might), the necessity of
attendance at the inter-faith table is for the good of the Christian her-
self, who, in dialogue with the other, may be enabled to engage more
easily in this self-critique, which might also be modeled for others.59
The Christian should not simply believe she is engaged in shaping;
in dialogue she is simultaneously being shaped. The other can also
help her to identify more sharply the confusions she has between re-
ligion and revelation, or religion and God. Gathering around this cri-
tique of or struggle with religion with the other can highlight this more
than a gathering with those who are like us. I was struck by this at the
2006 Society for the Study of Theology conference in Leeds, England.
In an extremely moving and (in a rarely appropriate use of the word)
holy paper, Aref Nayed placed “God” on the conference agenda in a
way in which Christian (and indeed Jewish) scholars—perhaps for be-
ing too similar to the others in this predominantly Christian confer-
ence—had been unable or unwilling to do.60 In a conference that had
addressed “Theology and the Religions,” God seemed at times to be
quietly absent from the discourse. This is no comment on the other
excellent and stimulating papers, but it is to say that in the Muslim
other’s entirely Muslim and in many ways confessional paper, the con-
ference was not reminded but, rather, moved to remember God in its
dialogues and discussions. In a presentation singularly regarding his
own faith, the implications of Nayed’s interpretation of Muslim
thought to Islam made clear to the ears of the Christian and Jewish
participants the need to reform Christian and Jewish theology in a way
similar to the manner in which Nayed had seemed to articulate Muslim
theology, not in a way that would make these theologies more “Muslim”
or “pluralist” but in a way necessary to make these theologies more
Christian and Jewish, respectively, reminding Christians and Jews of the
need to have the nature of God (however uniquely God may be con-
ceived to a faith) as central to any discussion of the theology of reli-
gions and salvation. The other in speaking about herself can convict
us to recognize the need to reform ourselves. As the other, she can
have a shaping effect upon us. In Barth’s terms, she can help us rec-
59 MacIntyre states that shared problems do not provide traditions with “a neutral standard
in terms of which their respective achievements can be measured. Some problems are indeed
shared. But what importance each particular problem has varies from tradition to tradition,
and so do the effects of failing to arrive at a solution” (Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which
Rationality? [London: Duckworth, 1988], 348).
60 Aref Nayed, “Al-Rahman: God the Compassionate” (paper given at the annual conference
of the Society for the Study of Theology, Leeds, 2006).
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ognize our own Unglaube in our own religion and remind us to turn
the critique of religion back primarily onto ourselves. The other can
help us approach the revelation offered to us in fresh and dynamic
ways and with critical eyes turned toward ourselves insofar as we make
it our revelation and confuse it with our religion. The other can help
us to recognize in the penultimate in which we all dwell the ultimacy
of God.
vi. conclusion
It is hoped that this short attempted application of Barth’s critique of
religion to the pressing question of inter-faith dialogue has pointed to
the creative fruit Barth’s work might bear on this topic. Taken from
the perspective of Christian faith, it is hoped that it helps us to un-
derstand the way in which we can gather together holding to the ve-
racity of our own faith (as others will to theirs) and, therefore, truly
as members of our faith community, simultaneously recognizing our
solidarity with the other under the term “religion.” Indeed, it is per-
haps under this title that we recognize most clearly the need to speak
to each other. Against the simple universalizing tendencies of moder-
nity, it is necessary to recognize the connected singularities of each
religion and the complexity with which we engage in speaking to the
other. The dangers of modernity in seeing us all as the “same” must
be countered along with the reactionary elements of our own traditions
that see the other religion as insurmountably alien and—at worst—the
enemy.
In recognizing this need to remember the critique of religion as a
religious person (or, more specifically, as a Christian), one sees the
great value of meeting around Barth. To end where we began, it stops
us from having two separate, dissimilar, and (ultimately) internally in-
coherent conversations that ignore each other. We are forced to re-
member the complex dynamics of inter-faith and secular-faith conver-
sations and to bring to each an awareness of the other.61 This is the
true mediation in which the practitioners of inter-faith dialogue are
engaged: in the secular-faith setting, reminding the secular powers of
the particularities of faith communities and ourselves of the critique
61 Ford states that “the world is not simply religious and not simply secular but is complexly
both religious and secular, with all sorts of constantly shifting interactions and balances”;
David F. Ford, “Gospel in Context: Among Many Faiths” (paper presented at the Fulcrum
Conference, Islington, April 28, 2006). See also David F. Ford, “Abrahamic Dialogue: Towards
Respect and Understanding in Our Life Together” (paper presented at the inauguration of
the Society for Dialogue and Action, Cambridge, 2006).
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of “religion,” and in the inter-faith setting, reminding ourselves and
the other of the way in which secular modernity has shaped (often by
reaction) forms of our own faiths and reforming ourselves accord-
ingly.62 So often, our mediation is between faith and nonfaith in both
settings. These are matters that are best done together and over which
it is easier to come to clarity in dialogue with the other. Gathering
around a critique of religion can help us offer something formative; it
stops inter-faith dialogue being merely something proper and fitting
in which we engage and helps it to become essential for the good of
our own existence. To gather in this way begins to give a proper place
to the complex dynamic and dynamic complexity of gathering around
a table together as simultaneously members of different faith com-
munities and members of late-modern society.63
62 To quote Ford once more: “The pathologies of the religions are of course made worse
by their mirror opposites in the secular sphere, as the extremes reinforce each other. Unwise,
fundamentalist religious dogmatisms feed off unwise, fundamentalist secular ideologies, and
vice versa” (David F. Ford, “God and Our Public Life: A Scriptural Wisdom,” International
Journal of Public Theology 1 [2007]: 78).
63 As was the case with Barth’s ecumenical involvement, no doubt Barth’s own approach
to inter-faith dialogue would have been more ad hoc than this article may suggest: his approach
would have at once been more decided and also more open (and hence dialectical) than my
own. The article’s purpose throughout has been to think from Barth rather than toward him,
to push at Barth rather than to repeat his findings. It has proceeded, therefore, in the belief
that the present political climate of the West demands sustained and ongoing commitment
to inter-faith dialogue in order that conversations between faiths can be kept going. An
element of this was perhaps recognized by Barth in his acceptance of Marquardt’s critique
and his admittance that he had attended more to biblical Israel than contemporary Judaism:
see letter 260 to Dr. Friedrich-Wilhelm Marquardt, September 5, 1967, in Karl Barth Letters,
1961–1968, ed. Ju¨rgen Fangmeier, Hinrich Stoevesandt, and Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Edin-
burgh: T&T Clark, 1981), 261–63. Also of note on this point is Katherine Sonderegger,
“Response to Eberhard Busch,” in Hunsinger, For the Sake of the World, 80–94.
